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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case based on Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue No, 1: Was the trial court correct in granting Summary Judgment where
there was no disputed evidence that Consolidated and its agents breached any fiduciary
duties owed to the County?
Issue No, 2: Was the trial court correct in ruling as a matter of law in its
Summary Judgment that there was no breach of the Consolidated agents' duty of full
disclosure, whether that duty arose in tort or contract, where there is no disputed evidence
that the Consolidated agents knew about any of the buried demolition debris?
Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2: Summary judgment presents a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness. Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d
1238, 1243 (Utah 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court may
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is
one not relied upon below. Id.
Issue No, 3: Was the trial court correct in denying plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion
where there is no evidence to support plaintiffs speculation that Consolidated knew of
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buried demolition debris or violated any other duty?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to deny a Rule 56(f) motion is
reviewed under "the abuse of discretion standard." Crossland Sav. v Hatch, 877 P.2d
1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court will not revise the trial court's ruling
"unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Id. (quoting State v. Larson,
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)).
Issue No. 4: Was the trial court's certification of Consolidated's Summary
Judgment as a final order pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) proper?
Standard of Review: Whether a court's certification of a final order is proper
under Rule 54(b) is a question of law. Thus, the decision will be reviewed for
correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n., 814 P.2d 1099 (1991).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The following authorities are determinative of the issues:
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended).
2. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Rules 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. Rl 62-6-2 Utah Administrative Code.
Copies of the above cited authorities are contained in the Addendum to this Brief.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Nature of Case. Salt Lake County (the "County"), as buyer, entered into a
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") with Western Dairyman Cooperative, Inc.
("WDCI"), as seller, to purchase real property. Charles L. Davis ("Davis"), a real estate
agent with Consolidated Realty Group ("Consolidated"), represented the County and
Herman L. Franks ("Franks"), also a real estate agent with Consolidated, represented
WDCI in the transaction. William K. Martin ("Martin") acted as Consolidated's principal
broker. After closing, the County encountered undisclosed subsurface conditions. This is
an action arising out of the REPC where the County seeks to recover costs to cure the
subsurface condition against WDCI and Davis, Franks and Martin and Consolidated
(hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "Consolidated").
B. Course of Proceedings. The County filed a complaint in Third District Court
on or about June 26, 1998, alleging two causes of action against Consolidated: (1) breach
of duty of reasonable care and (2) breach of duty to disclose. (Record at 00012-00034).
Consolidated filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on August 28,
1998. (Record at 00073). The motion was made based on the grounds that: (1) "under
the applicable Utah case law," a real estate agent has no duty to disclose latent defects of
which he has no knowledge; and (2) plaintiffs action is a tort claim barred by the
"applicable statute of limitations." (Record at 00073-74). Affidavits of Davis, Franks
and Martin were submitted in support of the motion and it was treated as a Motion for
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Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Record at
00095-103). The County opposed the motion and filed a Rule 56(f) motion for additional
time to conduct discovery. (Record at 00136-147). A hearing was held on Consolidated's
Motion to Dismiss together with the County's Rule 56(f) motion on February 19, 1999.
(Record at 00244-250 and 00664).
C. Disposition at Trial Court. A Memorandum Decision was issued March 10,
1999, denying the County's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Consolidated's Motion to
Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. (Record 00264). The final Order was signed by the
trial court on May 10, 1999. (Record at 00334). On May 18, 1999, the County filed a
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial. (Record at 00342). This Motion
was heard by Judge McCleve on December 10, 1999. (Record at 00638). On May 8,
2000, Judge McCleve entered an Order and Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) Certification of Final
Order affirming the May 10, 1999 Summary Judgment denying the County's Motion to
Alter or Amend the Judgment. (Record at 00645).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. WDCI owned a 5.06 acre parcel of real property in Murray City, Salt Lake
County, Utah, located at approximately 800 East 5300 South (the "Property") which
formerly had been used as a milk processing plant until approximately 1986 when WDCI
ceased operations. During its operation, the Property contained several buildings, parking
areas and underground storage tanks. WDCI demolished the building in approximately
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1992, removing all buildings from the surface. Unbeknownst to the parties to this appeal,
the demolition was partial, and the remaining concrete footings, slabs, debris and other
material were left buried under the surface. (Record at 00003-00004).
2. During 1993, Franks, as agent for Consolidated, was retained to represent
WDCI as the seller of the Property. At that time, there were no buildings or structures on
the Property which were visible to any inspection of the surface. Neither Franks nor
anyone at Consolidated was aware of or had ever been led to believe there were
subsurface concrete and waste pilings, footings, slabs, debris or other material under the
surface of the Property left after demolition. It appeared to Frank and all other
representatives of Consolidated that the Property was a vacant lot covered with dirt,
gravel and weeds. (Record at 00102). During June of 1993, the County began looking
for land on which to build a new Environment Health building. They considered several
sites, including the WDCI property. (Record 00004).
3. During the summer of 1993, Lee Colvin ("Colvin"), a licensed real estate agent
and broker employed by the County in the Contracts and Procurement Department's Real
Estate Section, was requested by the County Health Department to assist it in locating
commercial sites suitable for the Division of Environmental Health office building.
(Record at 00154). Shortly thereafter, Colvin contacted Davis on behalf of the County
and requested his assistance in locating a suitable commercial site for the Health
Department building. Several sites were identified by Davis, including the Property.
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(Record at 00154-155).
4. After Davis informed Colvin of the Property, Colvin walked the site and
observed that it was a vacant ground covered with weeds. He observed what appeared to
be a striped asphalt and concrete parking pad on a portion of the Property. He was also
aware that it had previously been occupied by Hi-Land Dairy and that the buildings had
been demolished years ago. However, he stated that he saw no visible evidence of
buildings, foundations or other structural elements at the time he walked the Property.
(Record at 00155).
5. Colvin wrote a letter dated September 24, 1993 to Davis informing him the
County was preparing an offer on 4.96 acres on the southwest corner of Wood Oak and
Vine Street and set forth the basic terms the County was willing to include in the offer.
Colvin also indicated that he would instruct the County's attorneys to draft an offer for
presentation to the County Commission for approval, and upon receiving approval, he
would forward the offer to Davis for presentation to the seller. (Record at 00156-157,
00163-164).
6. Colvin arranged for an independent MAI appraisal to confirm the value of the
Property. The valuation report did not disclose any latent defects affecting the value of
the Property. (Record at 00156).
7. The County, by its attorneys, drafted a Real Estate Purchase Contract
("REPC") dated on or about December 24, 1993. (Record 00156 and 00166-169).
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8. An Agency Disclosure was presented by Consolidated to the County for
execution, confirming the relative duties of Consolidated as real estate agents
representing both buyer and seller, and of the buyer and seller. (Record at 00170-00395).
A counterpart of the Agency Disclosure was also signed on or about December 24, 1993
by W.L. Cottrell, Vice President for WDCI. (Record at 00396).
9. Before closing, WDCI provided documentation to Davis who delivered said
documents to Colvin on behalf of the County regarding the demolition of buildings on
both the east and west sides of Vine Street, removal of underground storage tanks and all
other environmental conditions. (Record at 00103, 00157 and 00172).
10. As part of the conditions precedent to the County's obligation to perform
under the REPC, the County, by its attorney, drafted that their offer was subject to their
satisfaction of an environmental audit to be performed at their own expense.
Furthermore, the County required WDCI to provide it with copies of any environmental
audits or reports already in their possession, including reports on removal of the
underground tanks and hazardous materials spills, as well as any studies, surveys or
information pertinent to the Property then in WDCFs possession. (Record at 00024).
11. Consolidated, through Franks and Davis, provided copies of all
documentation received from WDCI to the County prior to closing. Davis, as
Consolidated agent representing the County, knew the County had its own real estate
department, engineers, surveyors and appraisers review the Property prior to closing and
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that Salt Lake County would be conducting tests they deemed necessary on the subject
Property. (Record at 00097 and 00103).
12. Salt Lake County undertook to conduct its own environmental testing and soil
sampling of the Property in order to determine it to be free of contamination or
environmental hazards. (Record at 00184). The County had a phase I environmental
study done on the Property. (Record at 00663, page 44). Prior to closing, a report from
the engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator was given by WDCI to the County
regarding a soils assessment on the Property. The report included data from at least six
(6) soils borings to twelve (12) feet deep which had been performed on the Property.
(Record at 00084 and 00324).
13. The County encountered subsurface conditions including demolition debris
during June 1997 when construction began. They claimed costs incurred in removing the
subsurface concrete, back filling, compaction and construction delays in an amount in
excess of $444,000. (Record at 00007-00009).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Summary judgment should be affirmed because there is no evidence of any
breach of fiduciary duties by Consolidated and its agents. There is no evidence that any
Consolidated agents knew of the buried debris under the Property, and there is no
evidence of any breach of duty by Consolidated or its agents in representing the County.
2. The fiduciary duties described in Agency Disclosure were merely a statement
of existing common or administrative law duties of real estate agents/brokers; therefore,
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any claim for breach of those duties gives rise to a tort claim, not a contract claim.
3. The trial court was correct in denying Rule 56(f) motion because adequate
discovery was undertaken and plaintiffs assertion of breach of duty by Consolidated is
speculative and without merit.
4. The trial court's Rule 54(b) certification of the summary judgment as a final
order was justified since causes of action against Consolidated and its agents are separate
from the causes of action against WDCI and stand on their own.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF ANY DUTY BY
CONSOLIDATED OR ITS AGENTS.
A. Consolidated met its duty of disclosure.
There is no dispute in this matter on appeal that Consolidated, through its agents,
acted in the role as dual or limited agents. (Record 00395-396). Despite the County's
attempts to create factual disputes and to insinuate that Consolidated somehow violated
the Utah Real Estate Commission's rules and common law governing licensed real estate
brokers or agents, as disclosed in the Agency Disclosure (Record at 00395), a straightforward review of those rules and cases demonstrate not only compliance by
Consolidated and its agents, but support for summary judgment.
Utah Administrative Code Rl62-6-2.6.2.7 requires that in every real estate
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transaction involving a real estate broker or agent, "the licensee shall clearly disclose in
writing to the buyer and seller . . . his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be
made prior to the buyer and seller . .. entering into a binding agreement with each other."
Furthermore, Utah Admin. Rl62-6-2.6.2.7.1 requires that the prior agency disclosure is to
be confirmed in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to the agreement by
including the following language:
AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this contract the listing agent
represents ( ) Buyer ( ) Seller, and the selling agent represents ( ) Buyer
( ) Seller. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this contract
written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her.
( ) (Buyer's Initials) ( ) (Seller's Initials).
Separate copies of the Agency Disclosures were signed by both Salt Lake County
(Record at 00395) and by WDCI (Record at 00396). As required by the Administrative
Rules, the REPC (Record at 00392-394) confirmed the existence of the Agency
Disclosure at paragraph 4 wherein it was disclosed that the listing agent, Franks,
represented the seller, and the selling agent, Davis, represented the buyer. By initialing
that section, both buyer and seller confirmed that prior to signing the REPC, "written
disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided" to them. {Id.). The Agency
Disclosure is just that - a disclosure to both buyer and seller of the respective duties of the
agents representing both buyer and seller and of the duties of buyer and seller - not a
contract.
The Agency Disclosure informed the County and WDCI of the duties of a real
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estate agent acting in the role as "dual agent" or "limited agent," which disclosure
basically reaffirmed the fiduciary duties owed by real estate brokers/agents to their
respective clients as established under the Utah Real Estate Commission's rules set forth
in the Administrative Code. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 n.3 (Utah App.
1998). Even though it is conceded that the Agency Disclosure actually exceeds in some
ways the specific requirements of Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-2.6.2.16.3, the basic duties
of a dual or limited agent as set forth in the Agency Disclosure include a fiduciary duty of
care, integrity, honesty and loyalty in dealings with both buyer and seller, a duty to
exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence in performance of the agents' duties, a duty
of honesty and fair dealing with good faith, and a duty to disclose all facts known to the
agent which materially affect the value of the property "that are not known to or within
the diligent attention and observation of the parties," except for the disclosure that the
seller will accept the price less than the listing price or that the buyer will pay a greater
price than the offering price. (Record 00395).
Utah Administrative Code R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.1 establishes the duty of neutrality.
This duty requires both buyer and seller to give up "their right to demand undivided
loyalty from the agent" where the agent is to advance the interest of each party as long as
that does not create a conflict with the interest of the other party. Utah Admin. Code
R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.1(a). This duty of neutrality would also impose the duty of obedience
which obligates the agent and broker to obey all instructions from either buyer and seller
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as long as the agent's duty of neutrality was maintained. Utah Admin. Code R1622.6.2.16.3.2(a). Nevertheless, there is no requirement under Utah law, either through
statutory, administrative or common law, for an agent to undertake an investigation. The
agent only has a duty to disclose material information which the "agent learns about the
property" (Utah Admin. Code. Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.2(c)) or those "latent or significant patent
defects of which the agent is aware." Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Utah
App. 1994); see also Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248-1249 (Utah 1980).
In its initial Memorandum in Opposition to Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss as
well as in this appeal, the County has argued that summary judgment ought to be
precluded because Consolidated's duty analysis is erroneously based on Schafir v.
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). See Applnt. Brief at 26-27; see also Record
at 00117-119. The County asserts that Schafir is inapposite because: (1) that case
involved a tort claim since there was "no contract" defining the duties of the parties; (2)
the decision addressed only the duty of the selling agent to buyer; (3) it does not address
the duties of the buyer's agent; and (4) it does not define the duties of a broker in a dual
agency relationship. Applnt. Brief at 26-27. The County errs in its first assertion, since it
must be assumed from the facts that Bennion, who was identified as "the listing real
estate agent for the sale" was acting pursuant to an agency disclosure as required by the
Real Estate Commission's rules. Hence, it can be safely assumed that Bennion was
operating under the same or similar rules that are applicable to the facts of this case on
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appeal.
Even though Schafir involved the duty owed by a listing agent to a buyer, the duty
of an agent, as it relates to disclosure, does not differ regardless of whether the agent is
the buyer's, seller's or a dual agent. In any of the three possible relationships, a real
estate agent has an obligation to disclose any material facts, including latent or significant
patent defects, of which the agent is aware. However, there is no administrative rule, case
law or statute which requires a real estate agent, acting as buyer's agent, a listing agent, or
as a limited or dual agent to affirmatively discover latent defects. To graft that duty upon
the existing law in Utah would create an untenable situation requiring real estate agents to
undertake responsibility and liability well beyond the scope or training of their
profession. Real estate brokers and agents would be required to perform tasks of
geotechnical engineers, home inspectors, lawyers, surveyors, and contractors if that
affirmative duty to discover defects in the property were imposed upon them. The courts,
the Real Estate Commission and the Legislature have all recognized this reality and
consequently only require the agent to inform the buyer of "all material information
which the agent learns about the property or the seller's ability to perform his obligation .
. . ." See Utah Admin. Code R162-6-2.6.2.16.2(c); see also Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390 (the
agent's duty to be honest and truthful includes the obligation to disclose defects of which
the agent is aware).
The County has suggested that Consolidated has ignored Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d
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790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986) which cites Easton v. Strassberger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199
Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984). The County argues that Easton establishes a different
standard applicable to real estate brokers where the court upheld the following
instruction:
A real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds himself out to
the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field.
He is under a duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property that are known to him or which through
reasonable diligence should be known to him.
Secor, 716 P.2d at 795 n.l (quoting Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at
387). Without defining or clarifying what the phrase "which through reasonable
diligence should be known to him" means, the County implies that Consolidated and its
agents had some sort of duty to investigate further the subsurface ground, beyond the
same visual inspection performed by the County's own in-house real estate agent, Lee
Colvin. That position is not supported by Utah law.
Even accepting the dicta in footnote 1 of Secor as precedent, this did not create a
duty of Consolidated to affirmatively undertake any investigation of the subsurface
conditions on the Property. In fact, the Easton question has been substantially
distinguished and clarified through case law in California and specific legislation
subsequent to Secor.
In 1997, the Court of Appeals of California addressed the duty of care of a real
estate agent to potential purchasers, as first pronounced in Easton, by addressing the
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legislation which added a new article to the California Civil Code (section 2079 et seq)
entitled "Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residential Property." Stats. 1985, ch. 223,
§2, p. 1221. The court explained that the Code contained the following express statement
of legislative intent, as amended and codified in 1994:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares all of the following: (1) That
the imprecision of terms in the opinion rendered in Easton . .., and the
absence of a comprehensive declaration of duties, standards, and
exceptions, has caused insurers to modify professional liability coverage of
real estate licensees and has caused confusion among real estate licensees as
to the manner of performing the duty ascribed to them by the c o u r t . . . . (4)
That sections 2079 to 2079.6, inclusive, of this article should be construed
as a definition of the duty of care found to exist by the holding of Easton ..
., and the manner of its discharge . . . . (b) It is the intent of the Legislature
to codify and make precise the holding of Easton . . . . It is not the intent of
the Legislature to modify or restrict existing duties owed by real estate
licensees.
Robinson v. Anne Marie Grossman, 57 Cal. App. 4th 634, 640-41, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380,
383 (1997).
In a footnote to the foregoing quote, the California Court of Appeal stated that
subdivision (b) of section 2079.12 of the California Code was interpreted "to mean the
Legislature had no intention of changing the existing law 'requiring] the agents to
disclose material defects known to the broker, but unknown to the prospective buyer.'"
Id. at n.3 (quoting Williams v. Wells & Bennett Realtors, 52 Cal. App. 4th 857, 863, 61
Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1997)).
Robinson further quoted Section 2079 as defining the duty of a real estate broker
or agent to prospective buyers of residential real estate "to conduct a reasonable,
15

competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to
that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the
property that an investigation would reveal.. . ." Id. The inspection required by Section
2079 "does not include or involve an inspection of areas that are reasonably and normally
inaccessible to such an inspection

" Id. 57 Cal. App. 4th at 641, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 384

n.4 (quoting Cal.Civil Code §2079.3). Finally, Robinson emphasized that nothing in the
article "relieves the buyer or prospective buyer of the duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect himself or herself, including those facts which are known to or within the diligent
attention and observation of the buyer or prospective buyer." Id. at n.4 (quoting Cal.
Civil Code §2079.5).
The California Court of Appeals refused to accept Robinson's argument that the
disclosure duties under §2079 included "a duty to independently verify or disclaim the
accuracy of the seller's representations." Instead, the court reasoned that the Legislature
sought to foster the availability of professional negligence insurance by
eliminating the implication oiEaston that a seller's agent could have
negligence liability for relying in good faith upon the seller's
representations or failing to discharge a vague obligation to obtain
professional inspections or reports to confirm those representations.
In other words, under the ipost-Easton statutory scheme, once the sellers and
their agent make the required disclosures, it is incumbent upon the potential
purchasers to investigate and make an informed decision based thereon. In
making the required disclosures, the sellers' agent is required only to act in
good faith and not convey the seller's representations without a reasonable
basis for believing them to be true.
57 Cal. App. 4th at 643-44, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385. Following this reasoning, the
16

Robinson court found the listing agent to be reasonable by relying upon the disclosure of
the seller that the stucco cracks were cosmetic and had been patched with stucco and glue
mixture, despite the contradictory testimony by plaintiffs expert that it was due to
geotechnical instability. 57 Cal. App. 4th at 644, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386.
The duty of disclosure established under the Agency Disclosure which is the
subject of this appeal (Record at 00395) is consistent with the foregoing analysis set forth
in Robinson. Both are consistent with Schafir. The section in the Disclosure Agreement
containing the duties of an agent representing both buyer and seller incorporates the
duties to the seller's agent and the buyer's agent as stated in their respective sections
within the Agency Disclosure document. The section under the heading of "Duties of
Buyer's Agent" states that the agent has the following duty:
(c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent which materially affect
the value of the property that are not known to or within the diligent
attention and observation of the parties.
(Record at 00395) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Agency Disclosure includes the
following "Duties of Buyer and Seller":
The above duties of real estate agents in a real estate transaction do not
relieve a Seller or a Buyer from the responsibility to exercise good business
judgment in protecting their respective interests. You should carefully read
all agreements to assure that they adequately express your understanding of
the transaction. If legal or tax advise is desired, consult a competent
professional attorney or accountant.
(Id.) Again, this language is consistent with Schafir which places the responsibility "to
observe patent, and any discoverable latent defects" on the buyer . Schafir, 879 P.2d at
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1390.
Based on the foregoing reasons, it becomes evident that neither Consolidated nor
its agents or broker knew or should have known of any subsurface condition. The
applicable law does not impose such a duty. Thus, the County has failed to establish any
evidence to preclude summary judgment on their claim against Consolidated for failure to
disclose.
B. Consolidated did not breach any other fiduciary duties.
As an additional basis for preclusion of summary judgment, the County has also
claimed Consolidated failed to exercise properly its "contractual fiduciary duties" beyond
plaintiffs disclosure objections. The County claims that Consolidated breached its
fiduciary duties by: (a) failing to include or recommend inclusion of provisions in the
REPC warranting against subsurface conditions resulting from previous demolition on the
Property; (b) failing to request WDCI "to provide a full and honest disclosure of the
subsurface conditions;" (c) failing to advise the County to "investigate and verify whether
WDCI had fully demolished all the buildings" and whether the County should undertake
additional investigation of the Property. (Record at 00017); Applnt. Brief at 23. The
record on appeal contradicts the County's claims by demonstrating that Consolidated in
fact did not breach any fiduciary duties and, consequently, is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
The letter dated September 24, 1993, written by Colvin, addressed to Davis at
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Consolidated, informed Davis that Salt Lake County was preparing an offer for the
Property. Colvin, as an employee and agent for the County, was himself a real estate
agent and broker with many years of experience. (Record at 00154). Colvin specified the
terms and conditions of the offer which would be drafted by a County Attorney and
approved by the County Commission. (Record at 00163). Only after the offer was
drafted by County Attorneys and approved by the Commission would Colvin forward it
to Davis for presentation to the seller. In other words, Davis was merely being treated as
a facilitator or conduit in passing on the offer. The terms of the REPC were already
drafted by the County's own attorneys by the time it was presented in final form to Davis
for presentation to WDCI in keeping with the admonition contained in the Agency
Disclosure for the buyer to "consult a competent professional attorney" if legal advice
was desired. Further, Davis had the obligation to obey the instructions of his client, the
County, in accordance with Utah Admin. Code. Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.3.2(a).
Davis certainly could have reasonably expected the County, given its size,
sophistication and staff, to make all reasonable inquiry to perform the County's own due
diligence pursuant to the requirements set forth in their proposed offer. It was reasonable
for Davis to believe any subsequent conditions would be discovered from the
environmental testing and soil sampling within the 90 day period proposed by the County
as part of their due diligence testing. Furthermore, the County would have an opportunity
to review all information available on environmental issues relating to the site provided
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by the seller. Davis would have overstepped his level of training and scope of practice to
presume he could suggest language in the REPC different than the requirements and
conditions drafted by the County's own attorneys. The REPC terms, especially the
addendum, appears to encompass and allow a complete disclosure, review and inspection
of the Property, which would allow discovery of any negative conditions one might
expect to encounter. If the County failed to uncover information regarding the extent of
the demolition, if such information were available, it was not due to any failure of
Consolidated to act. Rather, it was due to the County's failure to perform adequately
their investigation and inspection which they mandated in their offer.
Salt Lake County even hired an independent engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson
& Preator Engineering who did a preliminary soil assessment for underground storage
tank removal at the site on or about October 12, 1989, and provided a written report to the
County. (Record at 00084 and 00324). They also provided the County with the results of
six (6) soil borings to twelve (12) feet each. The County's engineers also provided a
schematic drawing of the old Highland Dairy site plan, which included an apparent
outline of the demolished building footprint. (Record at 00094). Based on that site
evaluation, Salt Lake County at any time could have performed further investigation to
discover the extent of the footings of the demolished property, but chose not to. There is
no basis for the County's argument that somehow the Consolidated defendants should
have known of the subsurface conditions, or that they should have given legal advice to
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to review all information available on environmental issues relating to the site provided
by the seller. Davis would have overstepped his level of training and scope of practice to
presume he could suggest language in the REPC different than the requirements and
conditions drafted by the County's own attorneys. The REPC terms, especially the
addendum, appears to encompass and allow a complete disclosure, review and inspection
of the Property, which would allow discovery of any negative conditions one might
expect to encounter. If the County failed to uncover information regarding the extent of
the demolition, if such information were available, it was not due to any failure of
Consolidated to act. Rather, it was due to the County's failure to perform adequately
their investigation and inspection which they mandated in their offer.
Prior to closing, WDCI gave Salt Lake County a written report by the independent
engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator Engineering which did a preliminary soil
assessment for underground storage tank removal at the site on or about October 12,
1989. (Record at 00084 and 00324). They also provided the County with the results of
six (6) soil borings to twelve (12) feet each. The County received a schematic drawing of
the old Highland Dairy site plan, which included an apparent outline of the demolished
building footprint. (Record at 00094). Salt Lake County at any time could have
performed further investigation to discover the extent of the footings of the demolished
property, but chose not to. The Consolidated defendants should not have been expected
to know of the subsurface conditions, or to have given legal advice to
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the County to include certain contractual provisions warranting that the Property was free
from subsurface debris. Under Addendum 1 attached to the REPC (Record at 00168), all
those concerns were explicitly or implicitly included in the language drafted by the
County's attorney. Davis was given this packet only after the County determined what
due diligence was necessary to satisfy itself of the Property's suitability for the proposed
Department of Health building. Consolidated was not, and should not as a matter of law
be placed in the position of second-guessing the legal work of Salt Lake County. In short,
there is no evidence of any breach of duty on the part of Consolidated. Rather, the
County appears to attempt to shift blame.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE
COUNTY'S CLAIMS AGAINST CONSOLIDATED WERE TORT
AND NOT CONTRACT CLAIMS. THEREFORE, THE COUNTY'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(3).
As discussed above, the Agency Disclosure was used to inform the parties of the
duties owed by the real estate agents to the respective parties to the transaction. The
duties existed as a result of the agency relationship agreed to by both the County and
WDCI. Even without the existence of the Agency Disclosure, those basic duties at issue
in this appeal would have been owed to the buyer and the seller because they were
independently established by common law and the Utah Administrative Code Rules. See
Wardley Corp., 969 P. 2d at 89 n.3; Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390; Secor, 716 P.2d at 795;
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Dugan, 615P.2dat 1248.
Any liability of Consolidated which might arise under the facts of this case is not
imposed by the terms of the Agency Disclosure, but by the rules set forth by the Real
Estate Commission under the Utah Administrative Rules, as authorized by the Utah
Legislature, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §61-2-5.5 (1953 as amended), which allows the
Commissioner to make rules which establish "standards of conduct for real estate
licensees". As a result of this authority, the duties of agents are set forth under the
Admin. Code Rl 62-6-2 entitled "Standards of Practice."
This Court ruled in Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const., 1AA P.2d 1370, 1372
(Utah 1987) that the following test applied in determining whether a six-year period
statute of limitation for contract liability applies to a particular fact situation: "[I]f the
fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals,
the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing." Id. (quoting Bracklein v. Realty
Insurance Co., 95 Utah 490, 500, 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938)). Applying the Bracklein test,
this Court found that
Absent the contractual obligations . . . the two contractors would have no
obligation to supervise construction of the Missionary Training Center.
Only the alleged breach of their contractual duties gives BYU any basis for
asserting that they are liable for the cost of replacing the pipes. BYU's
claims are, therefore, actions upon contracts founded on instruments in
writing and, as such clearly fall within the scope of the six-year period of
limitation in section 78-12-23.
Id.
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If the same test is applied to our fact situation to determine whether the County's
claim of breach of duty against Consolidated constitutes a contract claim or tort claim, the
only conclusion which can fairly be reached is that actions are for tort liability. In the
absence of the Agency Disclosure, Consolidated would still have been subject to the
standards and duties imposed on all licensed agents and brokers in Utah by common law
and the Utah Administrative Code. Those duties existed independently from the Agency
Disclosure. This fact demonstrated that the Agency Disclosure was not a contract. It was
merely a disclosure to the parties to the transaction of the respective duties owed by the
brokers and agents and the duties of the buyer and seller as it related to the transaction.
Thus, based on the nature of the Agency Disclosure and the Bracklein test, the claims of
the County against Consolidated are actions in tort, and subject to the four-year statute of
limitation in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended).
The County has admitted that the closing of the sale of the Property took place on
April 25, 1994. (Record at 00007). The County also alleged in its Complaint that "about
the first week of June, 1997" its contractor discovered "a subsurface concrete vault... a
piped irrigation ditch, and large subsurface concrete slabs, footings and rebar." (Record
at 00008). Thus, the County, by its own admissions, was aware of the subsurface debris
more than ten (10) months before the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation.
The County did not file its Complaint until June 26, 1998, after the applicable statute of
limitation had run.
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Because the subsurface defects were not visible to the County in their site visits,
one can argue that they are given equitable relief through the discovery rule exception to
the statute of limitations. See generally, Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah
App. 1993). However, the discovery rule does not apply to plaintiffs who become aware
of such undiscovered defects before the statute of limitation has expired. Brigham
Young, 744 P.2d at 1374. This Court has ruled that this "discovery rule has no
application when an action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery and
the end of the limitation period." Id. Where, at the very latest, plaintiff could have filed
its complaint within the ten-month period between its discovery and the running of the
statute of limitations, plaintiffs claims against Consolidated and its agents should be
dismissed.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE
COUNTY'S RULE 56(f) MOTION.
The trial court's decision to deny Rule 56(f) motion should be overturned only if it
is found to have abused its discretion. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it "will
not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Crossland Savings v.
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Larson, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361
(Utah 1993)). Even though trial courts should liberally grant Rule 56(f) motions, they are
not required to grant them if the movants are either dilatory or the claims are lacking in
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merit. Crossland, 877 P.2d at 1243; American Tower Owners v. CCIMechanical, 930
P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996). Moreover, a trial court should not grant a Rule 56(f)
motion simply to protect a plaintiff from the merits of a motion for summary judgment.
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1195 (citing Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556,
561 (Utah App. 1992)). This Court has previously delineated the following factors which
should be considered under any appeal of a denial of Rule 56(f) motion: (1) Whether the
affidavit articulated "adequate reasons or is the opposing party only on a 'fishing
expedition5 for purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant evidence?" (2) Whether there was sufficient time since
the filing of the complaint for plaintiff to use discovery procedures allowing crossexamination of the moving party? (3) If discovery was initiated on a timely basis, was
plaintiff given an appropriate response? Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838,
841 (Utah 1987).
The County argued in its Rule 56(f) motion that it was entitled to further discovery
to "examine the defendants under oath as to the extent of its [sic] knowledge of all related
matters to test its [sic] core assertion that it [sic] lacked any knowledge of the
concealment of the subsurface conditions." (Record at 00143). In his affidavit, Patrick F.
Holden, Salt Lake County Attorney, stated that the County needed to depose WDCI
employees "to ascertain what, if anything, they told Consolidated, et al. about the
condition of the subject property." (Record at 00149-150). Additionally, Mr. Holden
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stated that the County needed to conduct discovery "to ascertain what defendants [sic]
business practices are for listing property, whether they were followed in the instant case,
and if not, why not. These facts are relevant to whether Consolidated et al. breached their
fiduciary duties to Salt Lake County." (Record at 00150).
By their very assertions, the facts to counter the affidavits of Franks, Davis and
Martin were not exclusively within the control of the Consolidated defendants. Thus, the
County should have been able to obtain the information from other sources, including
informal discussions for discovery with WDCI personnel. Despite plaintiffs assertion to
the contrary, the County had ample opportunity to try to test the statements of lack of
knowledge by the Consolidated defendants before final judgment was entered. The
complaint was filed June 26, 1998. (Record at 00001). The Motion to Dismiss was filed
on August 28, 1998 (Record at 00073), followed by the filing of the County's Rule 56(f)
motion on September 21, 1998. (Record at 00136). A hearing on the Rule 56(f) motion
was not held until February 19, 1999. (Record at 00664). The County undertook informal
and formal discovery during that entire period up to the time of the hearing on its Motion
to Alter or Amend Judgment or For New Trial on December 10, 1999. The County took
the deposition of W. Lynn Cottrell, Vice President of WDCI at the time of the transaction,
on May 11, 1999. (Record at 00527).
The County served written interrogatories to defendants which further tested the
basis of its claims against defendants Franks (Record at 00251), defendant Martin

26

(Record at 00252) and defendant WDCI (Record at 00254). Despite the County's
informal and formal discovery, no evidence has been identified that would contradict the
affidavits of Franks, Martin and Davis. In other words, the most that Salt Lake County
could hope for is an opportunity to discredit the statements made by Martin, Franks and
Davis in their affidavits. Under those circumstances, the Utah Court of Appeals, in
Callioux v. Progressive Ins, Co., ruled that no material fact was presented, and the Rule
56(f) motion should be denied. 745 P.2d at 841 (citing Modern Home Inst, Inc. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 1975)).
Whether seeking additional time to discover the Consolidated agents' knowledge
of underground debris or their breaches of duty, such requests lack merit for the reasons
set forth above. The County has attempted to impose duties in connection with the
subject transaction on the Consolidated defendants which do not otherwise exist at law.
Where the motions are found to be "lacking merit," they may properly be denied. Rule
56(f) motions should not be granted merely to protect parties from the merits of the
motion for summary judgment. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1135. The County's
claims lack merit. Hence, this Court should affirm the denial of the County's Rule 56(f)
motion even if the trial court's reasoning was not specifically set forth.
POINT IV
CONSOLIDATED IS ENTITLED TO RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION.
The trial court issued a Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) Certification of Final Order in
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connection with its Order denying plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For
a New Trial, when it ratified the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of
Consolidated. (Record at 00645-649). The County avers that 54(b) Certification is
improper in that a significant factual overlap exists between the operative facts relating to
the claims against the Consolidated defendants and those remaining against WDCI.
Applnt. Brief at 41. However, as set forth in paragraph 3 of the Certification, the causes
of action against Consolidated and its agents are based on their separate roles as real
estate agents/brokers, and are distinct from the causes of action alleged by plaintiff
against WDCI, as seller of the subject property. It has already been demonstrated that
there is no evidence to implicate any knowledge by the Consolidated defendants of the
underground debris. The County has had its opportunity to discover this, and has come
up empty-handed. Whether WDCI had any knowledge which was not disclosed is
another matter. Certainly, this is a distinct issue relating only to WDCI. The
Consolidated defendants are, therefore, entitled to be released and the summary judgment
certified as a final order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Consolidated, Martin, Franks and Davis request
the Court to affirm the Summary Judgment and the denial of the County's Rule 56(f)
Motion.

28

4 day of January, 2001.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

x

Mark J. Williams
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees
Consolidated Realty Group; William K. Martin, Jr.;
Herman L. Franks and Charles L. Davis

29

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of Appellees Brief were mailed via
United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the £-7
Craig W. Anderson
Jay Stone
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State #S3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Robert L. Stolebarger
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

30

day of January, 2001, as follows:

ADDENDUM

A. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended).
B. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Rules 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
D. Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
E. Rl62-6-2 Utah Administrative Code.

ADDENDUM A

1

78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on
an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four
years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, Chapter
6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to one year,
under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
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ADDENDUM B

1
Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
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ADDENDUM C

1
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific fkcts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
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ADDENDUM D

1
Rule 54, Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from
which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master,
or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
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ADDENDUM E

1
Rl 62-6-2. Standards of Practice.
6.2.1. Approved Forms. The following standard forms are approved by the Utah Real Estate
Commission and the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licensees:
(a) September 30, 1999, Real Estate Purchase Contract (mandated use of this form is July 1,
2000);
(b) January 1, 1999 Real Estate Purchase Contract for Residential Construction;
(c) January 1, 1987, Uniform Real Estate Contract;
(d) October 1, 1983, All Inclusive Trust Deed;
(e) October 1, 1983, All Inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed;
(f) January 1,1999, Addendum/Counteroffer to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(g) January 1, 1999, Seller Financing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(h) January 1, 1999, Survey Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(i) January 1,1999, Buyer Financial Information Sheet;
(j) January 1,1999, FHA/VA Loan Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(k) January 1, 1999, Assumption Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(1) January 1,1999, Lead-based Paint Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract;
(m) January 1, 1999, Disclosure and Acknowledgment Regarding Lead-based Paint and/or
Lead-based Paint Hazards.
6.2.1.1. Forms Required for Closing. Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out
forms in addition to the standard state-approved forms if the additional forms are necessary to
close a transaction. Examples include closing statements, and warranty or quit claim deeds.
6.2.1.2. Forms Prepared by an Attorney. Any licensee may fill out forms prepared by the
attorney for the buyer or lessee or the attorney for the seller or lessor to be used in place of any
form listed in Rl 62-6.2.1 (a) through (g) if the buyer or lessee or the seller or lessor requests that
other forms be used and the licensee verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the
attorney for the buyer or lessee, or the attorney for the seller or lessor.
6.2.1.3. Additional Forms. If it is necessary for a licensee to use a form for which there is no
state-approved form, for example, the licensee may fill in the blanks on any form which has been
prepared by an attorney, regardless of whether the attorney was employed for the purpose by the
buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, brokerage, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling blank
legal forms.
6.2.1.4. Standard Supplementary Clauses. There are Standard Supplementary Clauses
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to Real Estate Purchase
Contracts by all licensees. The use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be
considered the unauthorized practice of law.
6.2.2. Copies of Agreement. After a purchase agreement is properly signed by both the
buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of each participating licensee to cause copies thereof,
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the buyer and seller with whom the licensee is
dealing. The licensee preparing the document shall not have the parties sign for a final copy of
the document prior to all parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to the terms thereof.
After a lease is properly signed by both landlord and tenant, it is the responsibility of the
principal broker to cause copies of the lease to be delivered or mailed to the landlord or tenant
with whom the brokerage or property management company is dealing.
6.2.3. Residential Construction Agreement. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement for
Residential Construction must be used for all transactions for the construction of dwellings to be
built or presently under construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has not been issued.
6.2.4. Employee Licensee. A real estate licensee working as a regular salaried employee as
defined in section 1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the employer or leases real
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estate owned by the employer, may only do so and may only be compensated directly by the
employer under one of the following conditions: (1) the licensee is a principal broker; (2) the
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom the licensee affiliates for sales or
management transactions; or (3) the employer contracts with a principal broker so that all
employed licensees are affiliated with and supervised by a principal broker.
6.2.5. Real Estate Auctions. A principal broker who contracts or in any manner affiliates
with an auctioneer or auction company which is not licensed under the provisions of Section
61-2-1 et seq. for the purpose of enabling that auctioneer or auction company to auction real
property in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all aspects of the auction comply with the
requirements of this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to real estate licensees in real
estate transactions. Auctioneers and auction companies who are not licensed under the
provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. may conduct auctions of real property located within this
state upon the following conditions:
6.2.5.1. Advertising. All advertising and promotional materials associated with an auction
must conspicuously disclose that the auction is conducted under the supervision of a named
principal broker licensed in this state; and
6.2.5.2. Supervision. The auction must be conducted under the supervision of a principal
broker licensed in this state who must be present at the auction; and
6.2.5.3. Use of Approved Forms. Any purchase agreements used at the auction must meet
the requirements of Section 61-2-20 and must be filled out by a Utah real estate licensee; and
6.2.5.4. Placement of Deposits. All monies deposited at the auction must be placed either in
the real estate trust account of the principal broker who is supervising the auction or in an escrow
depository agreed to in writing by the parties to the transaction.
6.2.5.5. Closing Arrangements. The principal broker supervising the auction shall be
responsible to assure that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of each real estate
transaction arising out of the auction.
6.2.6. Guaranteed Sales. As used herein, the term "guaranteed sales plan" includes: (a) any
plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed to be sold or; (b) any plan whereby a licensee or
anyone affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real estate if it is not purchased by a third
party in the specified period of a listing or within some other specified period of time.
6.2.6.1. In any real estate transaction involving a guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall
provide full disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee:
(a) Written Advertising. Any written advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales
plan" shall include a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligible, costs and
conditions may apply and advising the seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the
guaranteed sales agreement. This information shall be set forth in print at least one-fourth as
large as the largest print in the advertisement.
(b) Radio/Television Advertising. Any radio or television advertisement by a licensee of a
"guaranteed sales plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if any conditions and
limitations apply.
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements. Every guaranteed sales agreement must be in writing and
contain all of the conditions and other terms under which the property is guaranteed to be sold or
purchased, including the charges or other costs for the service or plan, the price for which the
property will be sold or purchased and the approximate net proceeds the seller may reasonably
expect to receive.
6.2.7. Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or
principal, the licensee shall clearly disclose in writing to his respective client(s) or any
unrepresented parties, his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the
parties entering into a binding agreement with each other. The disclosure shall become part of
the permanent file.
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6.2.7.1. When a binding agreement is signed in a sales transaction, the prior agency
disclosure shall be confirmed in the currently approved Real Estate Purchase Contract or, with
substantially similar language, in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to that binding
agreement.
6.2.7.2. When a lease or rental agreement is signed, a separate provision shall be
incorporated in or attached to it confirming the prior agency disclosure. The agency disclosure
shall be in the form stated in Rl 62-6.2.7.1, but shall substitute terms applicable for a rental
transaction for the terms "buyer", "seller", "listing agent", and "selling agent".
6.2.7.3. Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency relationship
with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent upon initial contact with
the other agent.
6.2.8. Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal broker or
branch broker informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in which the licensee is
involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received funds on behalf of the
principal broker or in which an offer has been written.
6.2.9. Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch brokers
shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all licensees affiliated
with them.
6.2.9.1. A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if:
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written policies or
instructions; and
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees receive
adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage;
and
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation.
6.2.9.2. The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the
broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities.
6.2.10. Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a transaction
will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in addition to a real estate
commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction.
6.2.11. Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee for referral of prospects to builders
must be paid to the licensee by the principal broker with whom he is licensed and affiliated. All
fees must be disclosed as required by Rl62-6.2.10.
6.2.12. Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a licensee refers a prospect to a
manufactured home dealer or a mobile home dealer, under terms as defined in Section 58-56-1,
et seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be paid to him by the principal broker with
whom he is licensed.
6.2.13. Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a principal broker to a buyer or seller, lessor
or lessee, in a real estate transaction as an inducement to use the services of a real estate
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the services of a brokerage, is permissible and is
not an illegal sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered to a buyer or seller, lessor
or lessee, who will not be obligated to pay a real estate commission in a transaction, the principal
broker must obtain from the party who will pay the commission written consent that the
inducement be offered.
6.2.14. "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees have an affirmative duty to disclose in
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writing to buyers and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "due-on-sale" clause in an
underlying encumbrance on real property, and the potential consequences of selling or
purchasing a property without obtaining the authorization of the holder of the underlying
encumbrance.
6.2.15. Personal Assistants. With the permission of the principal broker with whom the
licensee is affiliated, the licensee may employ an unlicensed individual to provide services in
connection with real estate transactions which do not require a real estate license, including the
following examples:
(a) Clerical duties, including making appointments for prospects to meet with real estate
licensees, but only if the contact has been initiated by the prospect and not by the unlicensed
person;
(b) At an open house, distributing preprinted literature written by a licensee, so long as a
licensee is present and the unlicensed person furnishes no additional information concerning the
property or financing and does not become involved in negotiating, offering, selling or filling in
contracts;
(c) Acting only as a courier service in delivering documents, picking up keys, or similar
services, so long as the courier does not engage in any discussion of, or filling in of, the
documents;
(d) Placing brokerage signs on listed properties;
(e) Having keys made for listed properties; and
(f) Securing public records from the County Recorders1 Offices, zoning offices, sewer
districts, water districts, or similar entities.
6.2.15.1. If personal assistants are compensated for their work, they shall be compensated at
a predetermined rate which is not contingent upon the occurrence of real estate transactions.
Licensees may not share commissions with unlicensed persons who have assisted in transactions
by performing the services listed in this rule.
6.2.15.2. The licensee who hires the unlicensed person will be responsible for supervising
the unlicensed person's activities, and shall ensure that the unlicensed person does not perform
activity which requires a real estate license.
6.2.15.3. Unlicensed individuals may not engage in telephone solicitation or other activity
calculated to result in securing prospects for real estate transactions, except as provided in
R162-6.2.15.(a) above.
6.2.16. Fiduciary Duties. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf owe the
following fiduciary duties to the principal:
6.2.16.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his
behalf who act solely on behalf of the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the
following fiduciary duties:
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to, act in the best interest of the seller or the lessor
instead of all other interests, including the agent's own;
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the seller or
lessor;
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all material
information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the transaction;
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the
agent by the seller or lessor which would likely weaken the seller's or lessor's bargaining position
if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the seller or lessor to disclose the
information. This duty does not require the agent to withhold any known material fact
concerning a defect in the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform his obligations;
(e) Reasonable care and diligence;
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS PublishingTM companies. All rights reserved.

5
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement.
6.2.16.2. Duties of a buyer's or lessee's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his
behalf who act solely on behalf of the buyer or lessee owe the buyer or lessee the following
fiduciary duties:
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the buyer or lessee instead
of all other interests, including the agent's own;
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the buyer or
lessee;
(c) Full Disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the buyer or lessee all material
information which the agent learns about the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform
his obligations;
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the
agent by the buyer or lessee which would likely weaken the buyer's or lessee's bargaining
position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the buyer or lessee to disclose
the information. This duty does not permit the agent to misrepresent, either affirmatively or by
omission, the buyer's or lessee'sfinancialcondition or ability to perform;
(e) Reasonable care and diligence;
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement.
6.2.16.3. Duties of a limited agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf
who act as agent for both seller and buyer, or lessor and lessee, commonly referred to as "dual
agents," are limited agents since thefiduciaryduties owed to seller and to buyer, or to lessor and
lessee, are inherently contradictory. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf may
act in this limited agency capacity only if the informed consent of both buyer and seller, or lessor
and lessee, is obtained.
6.2.16.3.1. In order to obtain informed consent, the principal broker or a licensee acting on
his behalf shall clearly explain to both buyer and seller, or lessor and lessee, that they are each
entitled to be represented by their own agent if they so choose, and shall obtain written
agreement from both parties that they will each be giving up performance by the agent of the
followingfiduciaryduties:
(a) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or
lessor and lessee, that they are giving up their right to demand undivided loyalty from the agent,
although the agent, acting in this neutral capacity, shall advance the interest of each party so long
as it does not conflict with the interest of the other party. In the event of conflicting interests, the
agent will be held to the standard of neutrality; and
(b) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or
lessor and lessee, that there will be a conflict as to a limited agent's duties of confidentiality and
full disclosure, and shall explain what kinds of information will be held confidential if told to a
limited agent by either buyer or seller, or lessor and lessee, and what kinds of information will be
disclosed if told to the limited agent by either party. The limited agent may not disclose any
information given to the agent by either principal which would likely weaken that party's
bargaining position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the principal to
disclose the information; and
(c) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to the buyer and
seller, or lessor and lessee, that the limited agent will be required to disclose information given to
the agent in confidence by one of the parties if failure to disclose the information would be a
material misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of the parties to fulfill
their obligations.
(d) The Division and the Commission shall consider use of consent language approved by
the Division and the Commission to be informed consent.
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6.2.16.3.2. In addition, a limited agent owes the following fiduciary duties to all parties:
(a) Obedience, which obligates the limited agent to obey all lawfiil instructions from either
the buyer or the seller, lessor and lessee, consistent with the agent's duty of neutrality;
(b) Reasonable care and diligence;
(c) Holding safe all money or property entrusted to the limited agent; and
(d) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement.
6.2.16.4. Duties of a sub-agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who
act as sub-agents owe the same fiduciary duty to a principal as the brokerage retained by the
principal.
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